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INTEGRATING THE GENERALIZED OTHER INTO THEORIES OF DIFFERENCE: 
BALANCING AND BRIDGING IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM* 
ABSTRACT 
Symbolic interactionist theories need to use the generalized in order to explain difference, 
but this essential term has been neglected. A "sense of group position" has been used to focus on 
difference, but this term is too structural. To bridge this gap in symbolic interactionism, we 
show that a generalized other is socially constructed through framing; this process of social 
construction involves internalization or externalization; multiple generalized others routinely 
exist and they create multiple selves; generalized others may be positive or negative; generalized 
others are ranked in terms of importance to the self; and difference springs from these different 
rankings. 
Keywords: generalized other; theories of difference; symbolic interactionism; framing 
Symbolic interactionist theories have had a long and intimate history of dealing with 
difference using the self in interaction with others, especially concerning race, ethnicity and gender. 
However, these explanations of difference do not always follow the basic tenets of symbolic 
interactionism (SI). In most SI work, the "generalized other" is often overlooked and the "self' 
dominates theoretical and empirical discussion. This causes a more inward-looking SI focused on 
the self, and makes it harder to have an additional outwardly-focused SI that could use the 
construction of the "other" to better explain inequality and contribute to solving agency-structure 
problems. To have difference beyond the basic individual and external world level, one must 
compare two conceptions of "others," but the study of the self alone does not make this apparent. 
Schwalbe et al. (2000) clearly focus on "othering" and inequality in an SI format, and we follow their 
example with greater attention to the basic theory of SI by balancing attention to selves with multiple 
generalized others, and by bridging traditional SI to a number of structural and even exchange 
theories in social psychology. 
First, a balance needs to be established between the highly studied "self' and the neglected 
"generalized other." SI's almost exclusive research focus on the self or identity has limited its 
abilities to explain difference. We claim that multiple "generalized others" can be used as a means of 
explaining difference in a more social constructionist way than with a "sense of group position" as it 
is currently presented. SI needs to use its basic concepts to explain difference through social 
interaction rather than using a structural deux ex machina. Difference in this paper is used in a wide 
focus and it can be constructed around a number of issues from being an enthusiastic gang or team 
member to larger groupings of class, race and gender (i.e., any in- or out-group). Our task is to show 
how group difference is constructed and transferred between people using "the generalized other." 
Thus, multiple generalized others" need to be connected to multiple selves and difference comes 
about from being positively perceived by one generalized other and negatively ( or less positively) 
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viewed by another. Situational and role-based behavior play a much smaller part than many 
symbolic interactionists have indicated. 
Second, effective bridges can also be made between SI and identity theory (Burke 2004, 
2006), expectation states theory (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway 2006 a,b ), and an affect theory of 
social exchange (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). For instance, it is important to differentiate 
person-based, role-based and socially-based identity and feelings (Stets and Burke 2005: 13-4). 
While only one of these three theories directly refers to the "self' (identity theory substitutes 
"identity" for the self but does use the term), and none of them actually use the "generalized other," 
these theories are structurally close enough to bring insights to bear on SI. Although this "bridge" is 
not a synthesis of these theories as Stryker (2008) would like, it brings in some of their compatible 
ideas. 
We proceed in four steps. The first step shows how the "generalized other" (abbreviated as 
the GO except in quotations) has been described and then neglected in most SI theories, and the 
second shows how theories of difference have been constructed in SI theory without using the GO. 
Third, five points are made to balance the self and GO, and to bridge the gap between the GO and 
difference. The fourth section presents examples from a study of race and another study of gender. 
And the fifth step is to provide an overall model of the GO in SI. 
The Generalized Other in Traditional Symbolic Interactionism 
Mead's theory centers the concepts of the"!," the "me," and the GO. These concepts relate 
to how the self is formed in relation to the broader groups with which the self is interacting. The 
"me" represents the socialized aspect of the self that makes presentations to the outside world where 
people observe the me. The "!" reviews and objectifies the "me" as others reflect their performance 
evaluations via the looking glass self, and it represents the sometimes unpredictable and creative part 
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of the self that is tactical and decisive (see Lewis 1979).1 For Mead, the GO is constructed from 
many different occurrences of taking the perspective of the other. Mead defined the GO as "the 
organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self' (Mead 1934: 
154). 
The GO provides the opportunity for reflexivity when the actor takes him or herself not only 
as subject but as an object as well (Mead 1934). It is through the GO that the community exercises 
control over its individual members. These attitudes toward the other then reflexively act upon the 
"I" and the "me," and the "self." The GO represents one's reflections on the sum total of the 
"reflected appraisals" of others toward one's performances, and can be viewed as a generalization 
about the various "me's" that are preformed. Mead's concept of GO is a fundamental theoretical 
concept that forms the foundation of intelligence in the "mind," the basis of the self-consciousness, 
the overall "self," and the link to social structure and community in "society" (Mead 1934; 2002: 190-
8). The GO refers to the possibility of the internalization of norms through the process of interaction 
with other members of society, and can be formed only in a social or virtual group. It is often the 
basis of morality, as the ability to gain a moral consciousness depends gaining the perspective of the 
GO (Mead 1934). 
Although Mead rarely uses "the looking glass self," Cooley's concept provides a basis for the 
GO in three ways: imagining one's performance before an other, developing some understanding 
through empathy about their judgment of your performance, and one's subsequent intellectual and 
emotional reaction to that judgment (Cooley 1922: 184). This alone is not the GO, but when the 
looking glass self or the "particular other" is combined with framing others, it impregnates the self 
with the "social." This step would lead to a full conception of the GO. 
1 The I in Mead is somewhat like Burke's "comparator" with an "identity standard" but the "I" is 
a larger concept functioning as the 'decider' on issues other than identity. 
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Mead is somewhat ambiguous on whether there are multiple GOs, especially connected to 
race or gender. He mentions family, political parties, friendship circles, nations, classes, political 
parties, clubs, corporations, and subgroups (debtors or creditors) as "social group(s) as a whole to 
which" people belong (1934: 156-9). These could provide a basis for multiple GOs even though he 
frequently mentions the GO in the singular. In his 1927 lectures, Mead briefly mentions multiple 
GOs in baseball games, vox populi (public opinion) and vox Dei (voice of god) (1982: 145). Some 
theorists are highly critical of Mead on this point. Meltzer says that Mead "oversimplifies the 
concept by assuming ... a single universal generalized other" (1994: 51). Charon (2007: 77) says 
that Mead "does not always make it clear if the individual has just one generalized other or several" 
and Lewis claims that "Mead's own statements about the generalized other are not theoretically 
sophisticated enough to account for ... complex interactions" (1979:283).2 
While Blumer's account of the self and the GO (1969) follows Mead, he delves deeper into 
the GO in a series of letters from 1979 to 1982. He lays out six levels of the GO: (I) "abstract 
human group life" or humanity, (2) an "abstraction of the common meanings of society," (3) "the 
abstract role of one's particular segment or circle in society," ( 4) an individualized version of an 
"abstract role in society" or "one's special circle," (5) the role of participants in a "given concrete 
situation" where "the GO would shift from one situation-area to another" ( e.g., from a baseball game 
to a church wedding), and (6) a "unique version of the complex of roles in a given situation-arena" 
(Blumer 2004: 117-8). He says that "the number of GOs in a society would correspond to the 
number of different social acts in that society ... in which he was prepared to participate," and 
consequently, he saw it as "embracing large combinations of separate acts" (2004: 126). These letters 
2 Antonio states that "Habermas views Mead as a path-breaking thinker who recognized implicitly 
the significance of communicative rationality but failed to express it full and rigorously in theory 
(1989:737; Habermas 1987:1-111). 
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are a rare insight into Blumer's thoughts about multiple GOs, but Blumer never systematized this in 
print, and many of his responses are contingent - "If Mead meant this, then that would result." 
Goffman' s dramaturgical approach focuses on one set of presentations of self in the front 
stage to intended audiences and another set of presentations to the back stage to fellow performers or 
supporters. His distinction between the stage and the audience leads to an important insight that 
could connect to the GO. Clearly, Goffman is thinking of two distinctly different "GOs," but he does 
not refer to the "I," the "me," or the GO. In this phase of his work, he is more concerned with roles 
and ritual theory rather than placing front stage and back stage into a SI framework (Collins 1988). 
In Goffman's later work, he used the "frame," which could be connected to the GO. He develops 
multiple frames and mentions "anchoring" processes that connect an activity to the "primary 
frameworks of particular social groups" (1986: 247-300). But in addition to switching frames, he 
allows for frame breaking, both of which keep this process from being deterministic (1974: 3, 25-7). 
However, Goffman looks at these frames or interaction orders as somewhat episodic, not as 
how people construct multiple GOs.3 Goffman frequently said that "(m)y perspective is situational" 
(1974: 8) and this tends to crowd out the GO. Although he often refers to groups, he seems to avoid 
viewing groups and their social construction as part of one's self formation process. To Goffman, 
the ensemble of actors is necessary, but he does not analyze them as a GO. In other words, his 
audience is passive, perhaps too much like a theater audience. While focusing on the self, Goffman 
generally avoids the remaining basics of SI (i.e., the I, me and GO)' and does not generate a theory of 
the GO and difference, which would need to go well beyond situations.5 
3 From this point on, we use "framing" in a way different from Goffman, one that refers to schemata 
that shapes groups or network contacts, which bears more similarity to the social movement 
literature. 
4 Collins argues that Goffman is not a symbolic interactionist (1988, 2004), but Scheff argues that he 
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Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Difference 
For Blumer, racial prejudice of the dominant group is a matter of the racial identification one 
makes of one's self and others, and the way the out group is conceived in relation to the dominant 
group. In focusing on the feelings of the dominant racial group, Blumer describes their beliefs in 
intrinsic difference, superiority, and privileges, and fears that the other will eliminate those privileges 
(Blumer 1958, 1965; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). First, group feelings point to and depend on the 
positional arrangement of the groups. This process is especially helped along by the active molding 
of these beliefs, privileges and fears by interest groups, and the whole process develops in a historical 
process rather than being created anew in each interaction. Second, the source of prejudice for 
Blumer specifically lies in the felt challenges to these feelings in: (1) affronts to feelings of group 
superiority, (2) familiarity or transgressing the boundary line of group exclusiveness, (3) 
encroachments of proprietary claim to goods or services, (4) challenges to power and privilege, and 
(5) direct and sometimes indirect economic competition for jobs (Blumer 1990:201). Prejudice 
becomes a defensive reaction and a protective device to each of these challenges. Often these 
situations evoke emotions of fear, and societies built upon difference often use fear to keep the other 
in their place. 
Third, the sense of difference is not created spontaneously but whatever interaction that is 
involved is embedded in a history of past contacts, especially initial contact. Subsequent experiences 
and interactions may form the sense of group position in several ways, whereby it is strengthened or 
sharpened or weakened. It may be deeply entrenched and resist change, or may barely take root 
is because of the basic structures of his work (2006). Goffman preferred the term "strategic 
interaction." 
5 Some other interpreters of Mead have a more philosophical focus on universals, ethics or political 
theory (Joas 1985: 119-44; Pfuetze 1954:75-8; Camic and Joas 2004: 5; Benhabib1992: 148-77). 
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(Blumer 1990: 202). However the experiences may mold the sense of group position, it is clear that 
the sense of group position formed by the dominant group defines and redefines the subordinate 
group. 
Fourth, a sense of group position is initially molded and shaped by the elite members of the 
dominant group (e.g., politicians and ministers in speeches and sermons). They repeat narratives that 
attack and question character of the subordinate group, and stimulate individuals to energize the 
group. If the feelings and views are not internally opposed, they fuse and grow. Thus, the collective 
image of the subordinate group and the sense of group position of the dominant group are 
established. Three implications arise from the subordinate group being seen as an abstraction: (I) 
the actual definitions of the subordinate group do not derive from experiences with specific 
individuals in daily association but through transcending characterizations of the group as an abstract 
identity; (2) the definitions created in the public arena are felt to be more important than other issues; 
and (3) actual experiences are subordinated to events or sentiments that arouse strong feelings of 
racial group identification. Spokespersons legitimate authority by communicating in public 
discussions in the media. These elites add to interpersonal interaction, and groups conceive of 
themselves and others through collective processes, especially through the public media. It is this 
"sense of social position," emerging from public encounters, that gives race prejudice its basis. 
But the spokespersons for the dominant group, who publicly characterize the subordinate 
group in a negative way, may be heeded or ignored. If spokespersons are ignored, they have little 
effect, and while supported by some, they may be laughed at by others ( e.g., the failed religious 
crusade to ban rock-and-roll as music of the devil and blacks). On the other hand, spokespersons can 
fabricate powerful narratives ( e.g., a white woman lied that she was raped by a black man, and whites 
murdered blacks in the Tulsa race riot (Madigan 2001)). Finally, the actions that interest groups take 
in directing the interpretation of events are not always seen by most participants, but they often 
involve well connected politicians and legal officials. 
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The problem with Blumer's "sense of group position" and Shibutani and Kwan's "group 
consciousness" (1965: 199-223) is that they tend to be more structural than interactionist. It is 
similar to expectation states theory that sees the origin of status hierarchies (i.e., difference) as 
coming from "doubly dissimilar encounters" where one group has fewer resources and they also have 
some sort of group difference that is already identifiable. Knowledge of these differences "diffuse 
widely throughout the population and gradually take hold" (Ridgeway et al. 1998:334). However, 
two points are important. First, media messages are discussed by friends, neighbors and co-workers 
in the multi-step process of communication (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Mutz 
2006). And these small groups often have opinion leaders. This allows social interaction and ample 
room for the operation of multiple GOs. Second, Blumer describes a process that downplays social 
interaction. Certainly history and its interpretation has an effect, but all history was once 
"interaction" involving concrete people and experiences. 
What appears to be missing from Blumer's theory is a social constructionist view of how 
difference is created through GOs with dominant and subordinate groups. It is one-sided to hold that 
a sense of group position does not come from the experiences of people in daily association (Blumer 
1958:6). Thus, an underlying tension in a sense of group position exists between "the Blumer who 
emphasizes ongoing interaction among human beings and the Blumer who emphasizes the 
relationship between dominant and subordinate groups" (Williams and Correa 2003 :750). More is 
needed on GOs in the construction of difference, especially on how the sense of group position 
emerges from the Meadian framework with the "I," the "me," and the GO. These mechanisms need 
elaboration. 
Goffman also focuses on difference through stigma, and deference and demeanor. Stigma 
refers to three attributes that are discrediting (Goffman 1963): (1) physical deformities of the body 
( e.g., scars), (2) blemishes of individual character ( e.g., weak will or domineering passions); and (3) 
the "tribal" stigma ofrace, nation, or religion. Stigmatized persons are different from those who are 
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categorized as "normals," which is the basis of conflict arising from difference. Stigma is closely 
related to deference and demeanor in rituals. Deference is "the appreciation an individual shows of 
another to that other" and it can be through avoidance, praise, or other actions. Demeanor is more 
indirect as it refers to behavior communicated "through deportment, dress, and bearing" (2005:77). 
Both terms focus on messages coming back to form a GO, though Goffman ignores this term. The 
third concept of "tribal stigma" proposes group difference especially if it can be inherited. But 
Goffman does little or nothing to expand on "tribal stigma" - a concept of difference ever so close to 
race and gender - even though it may be inferred to as "abominations of the tribe" (Berbrier 
2002:556). Goffman's front and back stages could combine with tribal stigma and translate into dual 
consciousness with multiple GOs (Smith 2006:101-2). But he does not pursue this lead, and his 
focus is clearly much more on situations rather than on group identity (1988, 2004). 
Hughes poses our question strongly in a neglected article entitled "What Other?" He says 
that"( o )ne of the complications of civilized life is that one is confronted with a variety of "others," 
some of whose directions are not compatible with those of some others." (1983/1962:122). We 
contend that this "other" needs to be further specified and theorized through the theoretical unit of 
the significant and GO in an increasingly diverse society (Williams 2002).6 The next section extends 
the GO, especially in developing difference. 
Bridging the Gap and Balancing the GO and the Self 
Mead's theory needs more emphasis on the mechanisms that compel the "me" of the self to 
internalize the norms and values of various GOs and apply the evaluation of these GOs to difference. 
This gap in SI can be filled in at least five ways: (1) the concept of role is overused in SI and it needs 
work to be delimited; (2) multiple GOs exist and they routinely create multiple selves; (3) a GO is 
6 Prus mentions "attending to the viewpoints of the other" and "there can be no self without the 
other" ( 1997: 6). While he does not use the GO, intersubjectivity would have to flow through GOs. 
9 
socially constructed through framing, not the result of an imposed or taken role, and this process of 
social construction may involve internalization and externalization; (4) GOs may be positive and 
negative in terms of being a benefit or threat towards the self, and this intrinsically involves 
difference; and (5) GOs may be ranked, which most often involves difference, or may be co-equal in 
a collection of different others. 
Role, Social and Personal GOs. The social construction of multiple GOs in SI needs to clarify 
the concept of "role." The use of role is ambiguous in three ways. First, Mead and Blumer use "role" 
in their term "taking the role of the other" which often means the empathetic process of"putting 
yourself in the place of another."7 This makes it intrinsically part of the GO process. Second, Mead 
and Goffman use "role" as a term to designate a situation rather than behavior conducted with fixed 
norms and values. This is more akin to Goffman's reference to role in dramaturgical role-taking in 
the presentation of the self in rather unstructured situations. A third group of structural theorists 
(Turner 1956, 1962; Stryker 2008, 2002; McCall and Simmons 1966, 1982; Burke and Stets 2009) 
use the term "role" in a more formal way that refers to the norms and values attached to a position in 
society that sometimes leads to a more structural theory of society. 
But if one takes all three approaches, nearly all social behavior is "role behavior." For 
instance, should we study the "racist role" or "sexist role?" Further, "taking the role of the other" is 
making internal social psychological processes into role behavior. This ambiguous use ofroles 
simply puts the term into a reductionist position that all social interaction is role behavior. From our 
7 Blumer often disparaged role theory sometimes with the following story. At a break in labor 
negotiations in the steel industry during World War II, the head of the union and his negotiators 
dropped to their knees and started praying for the company negotiators. Blumer said that the role of 
a union negotiator would not include "praying for management." 
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approach, some social interaction involves roles and other interaction does not, and there is a 
circumscribed place for "role" as a position in society with clear norms and values. 
These different meanings need to be specified, which can be done by putting different 
adjectives in front of "role" or by using different terms. Social interaction begets various GOs from 
the bottom up, and institutions and organizations can impose roles from the top down. Individuals 
perceive "concrete" or "particular others" engaging in behavior, which will be later described as 
"staging presentations of selves" through a "me." The perceptions of the behaviors of these concrete 
particular others may be grouped into a GO as with a "group GO" composed of a set of friends or a 
"situational GO" composed of an audience or group of people at a party. One might like to impose a 
role of friend or partygoer on these interactions, but often times people's behaviors are so variegated 
that the use of such a formal tenn as "role" is problematic. Often fellow party-goers cannot be 
clearly classified into friends, acquaintances, or even enemies. Even using Goffman's approach to 
public behavior, these "informal roles" are really practical experiments in "staging presentations of 
selves." 
On the other hand, there are social situations where roles are of great use. For instance, family 
interactions may lead to conceptions of "mother" and "father" as constructed roles, but these roles 
become more formalized in historical traditions and laws that have major implications about how 
mothers and fathers should act. Child abuse or neglect can easily land a mother or father in jail. 
From another perspective, organizations often formulate positions with job descriptions and these 
positions become clear roles with norms and values. The professions with the concrete roles of 
nurse, teacher, and doctor would fit this use, especially with their codes of ethics and specialized 
training. Non-perfonnance of such a formalized or "structured role" can lead to losing the 
"structured role" (e.g., mothers or fathers can have their children removed, workers or managers can 
be fired, or professionals can lose their licenses). In these cases the socially constructed GOs meet 
the more formally constructed aspect of roles. 
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Using a more nuanced view of"roles" can help define and specify encounters of the self and 
GO, and despite claims to the contrary, avoids sliding all social interaction into roles as a structural 
aspect of society as in Stryker (2002) and McCall (1970). There is some evidence of a more 
balanced view of roles in a number of theories related to Sl.8 First, Burke and Stets' use of identity 
theory sees self-verification processes, while not using the GO, being based on the reflected 
appraisals that come from particular others, GOs, or role-based others with person-based, group-
based, and role-based identities (2005: 13-4). And this is very close to Fields et al.'s view that "we 
cannot feel shame" or many other emotions "without having developed a generalized other" (2006: 
158).9 Second, in self-perception theory, these behavioral assessments with their feelings and 
attitudes may be constructed or revised after the fact rather than before by an active evaluation and 
framing of one's GO (Bern 1972, Laird 2007). Third, from status expectations theory, "doubly 
dissimilar encounters" lead to the development of status value beliefs about categories and groups 
rather than just roles (Ridgeway et al. 1998), and how cultural schemas lead to difference codes 
8 Using an affect theory within exchange theory, the more social network aspects of the GO can be 
formulated with attention to "global emotions" that feed back to the self and are transformed into 
"specific emotions" that formulate perceptions of GOs. The outcomes in terms of negative and 
positive shared responsibilities would be trust/fear, pride/shame, gratitude/anger, or 
attachment/detachment (Lawler et al. 2008). 
9 Although Burke and Stets (2009) generally avoid using the GO (e.g., they mention the term once on 
p. 20), they differentiate the basis of identities on "role, group, and person" such that "role identities" 
are tied to social positions as "a category in society or an organization that an individual occupies" 
(2009: 114). 
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(Ridgeway 2006). And what are these status expectations other than the feedback of particular or 
concrete others aggregated and synthesized into a GO. 10 
Multiple GOs. Multiple selves are now well recognized though Mead and Blumer certainly 
did not emphasize them as shown above. But William James (1983) referred to multiple selves in 
1890 and W. E. B. Du Bois' concept of"double consciousness" provides a clear starting point on 
racial difference as African-Americans have two different forms of consciousness or self for whites 
and black communities (2005). And in the last two decades, the concept of multiple selves has 
become popular (Weigert and Gecas 2003; Thoits 1986; Thoits and Virshup 1997; Markus and Wurf 
1989). Following SI theory, if there are multiple selves, there must be multiple GOs.11 
The first direct reference to this comes with Shibutani's work using "reference groups." 
Robert Merton developed "multiple reference groups," positive and negative reference groups, and 
the selection of reference groups (1957: 240-50, 302-8). Shibutani (1961 :514-32; 1955) picked up 
on reference groups, and after the preparatory, play and game stages, extends Mead's stage theory to 
the "reference group stage" where the interacting individual links to several reference groups. 
Society is seen as a mosaic of patterned interactions and relationships that are grouped by many 
different reference groups, each with their own "perspective." Charon comments that in Shibutani's 
approach "the individual uses several reference groups, has several perspectives, and interacts with a 
10 Expectation states and related theories have do not use the GO and mention little about reflected 
appraisals. Nonetheless, asking where expectations come from elicit concerns about a GO, but the 
closest it comes is "behavioral interchange patterns" (Ridgeway 2006a,b ). Although its origins are in 
social exchange theory, its focus on hierarchies is somewhat similar to Blumer's "sense of group 
position." 
11 Burke and Stets concept of "reflected appraisals" would be a much more fragmented and 
espisodic view of the GO. 
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number of social worlds, and ... therefore ... the individual can no longer be said to have a single 
generalized other" (2007: 77-8, 109-14).12 However, other than Hewitt's mention of "reference 
others," Shibutani's use of"reference groups" has been avoided by SI (1988). Nonetheless, 
Shibutani hits upon something useful that can be developed. In effect, these stages demonstrate the 
development of the GO, which Mead demonstrated with the game stage of understanding other roles 
on a baseball team. Instead of the reference group stage, Shibutani is describing the next step with 
the say "left fielder" realizing that he or she is on one team and that they are playing a competing 
team (Mead 1934: 150-64). This can be called the "group" stage that categorizes the in-group as 
contrasted with an out-group. One GO reflects in-group praise for a base hit, but the out-group GO 
reflects disapproval for the same act. This simple sports analogy can be generalized for many group 
activities from nerds, goths and socials in school to categorical generalizations about deaf, gay and 
racial supremacists (Berbrier 2002; Harris 2009). In effect, Shibutani is saying that Mead did not go 
quite far enough on this stage theory concerning the formation of GOs. 
Stryker sees a similar situation coming out of social networks that are intersected by cross-
cutting boundaries of class, ethnicity, age, gender, and religion. People live their lives in relatively 
smaHsocial networks (Stryker and Burke 2000). This structural SI perspective delimits the 
boundaries of a11 these social networks and they are able to block or permit the individuals' access to 
these networks. For instance, racial social structures would block an African-American in the 1950s 
from the social networks leading to good jobs and elite clubs. Individuals continually have to adjust 
their identities and emotions depending on the norms of the network. And if a good fit is lacking, the 
12 Charon says that Shibutani calls society a "reference group" and the GO is taken as a "perspective" 
(1985: 164). He then says that Shibutani used "several reference groups." In figure 11-1, Charon 
outlines one GO constructed from multiple perspectives. These shifts from society as a whole to 
multiple and smaller reference groups are difficult to reconcile. 
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individual may leave (Stryker 2002; Fine 1990, 1991). While he does not develop the concept of the 
GO, Stryker's concept of cross-cutting boundaries and "small and specialized networks" suggest 
multiple GOs. 
Selecting, Shaping and Framing. An adequate view of the GO needs concepts with which 
individuals select and shape multiple GOs out of social networks, whether they are cross-cutting or 
not. The self is not passive toward its GOs as it actively frames and shapes them. Each person only 
takes some of what they see from reflected appraisals and ignore other items (Kinch 1963; Lundgren 
2004). Thus, a "selective reinforcement" process that is not deterministic exists between self and 
"significant and generalized others" (Yeung and Martin 2003: 844; Quarantelli and Cooper 1967; 
Miyamoto and Dornbusch 1956). When people are young and malleable during primary 
socialization, "internalization" may be the most important result of the messages coming from 
multiple GOs. During adolescence teenagers often rebel against a familial GO, and construct new or 
modified selves as peer groups construct GOs (e.g., goths, varsity, nerds, socials, etc). As one's 
sense of self becomes firmer, people often engage more in "externalization" as they try to impose 
their "selves" and the way the GO should interpret them (Yeung and Martin 2003: 846). 
Identification others are important for solidarity since "they are like me" or "they are like what I want 
to be"; and valuation others that consist of others who pass judgments on you, often negatively ( e.g., 
cliques, gangs, managers, teachers, juries, ethnic or racial groups, etc.) (Turner and Stets 2004; 
Turner 1988, Turner 1956). This basically corresponds to internalization and externalization. 
First, groups of higher status people or more forceful personalities often externalize their 
evaluations of others - "oppressive othering" or "other-categorization"- often accompanied by 
"powerful virtual selves" to which subordinates may respond with "defensive othering," "trading 
power for patronage," and "forming subcultures" (Schwalbe et al. 2000: 422-9; West and 
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Fenstermaker 2002: 146-63).13 These strategies are the result of several presentations of self (i.e., the 
me's advanced in interaction) with specific motives and intentions. Conversely, selves may 
internalize the view of critical GOs and accept imposed evaluations as with the internalization of 
labeling theory or Garfinkel's degradation ceremony (1967). For instance, shame may occur when 
one takes the role of the GO and realizes that others see one's "base motives" rather than one's 
"glowing self image," and embarrassment may occur when one takes of the role of the GO and 
realizes that one has "bungled a presentation of self' (Shott 1979: 1325) (See table l). 
********** Table I********** 
And there is a GO created in specific interactions or carried from one interaction to another, and a 
GO that is free from interaction and free floating. 
Second, when encountering externalization or valuation, people create or modify their own 
group's GOs through internalization. Usually these are positive evaluations but when confronted 
with negative imposed GOs, they often must modify or create new subcultures with their own GOs. 
DuBois' "dual consciousness" is a good example of this. In column 3 of table I, we illustrated three 
different high status and three different low status processes for creating internal or identification 
GOs. According to SI, each GO then leads to the construction of specific and multiple selves, but 
clearly, the GO plays a role in creating or modifying that self. While this construction benefits from 
many of the terms used by Schwalbe et al. (2000), table I also includes the rows 7 ->8 ->9 and 16 
-> 17 -> I 8 that indicate processes that involve some countering of the dominant processes of 
13 We use Schwalbe et al.'s (2000) negotiated order perspective, but our use of the "other" differs. 
They define "othering" as "the process whereby a dominant group defines into existence an inferior 
group (2000:422) using four generic processes of oppressive "othering," subordinate adaptation, 
boundary maintenance, and emotional management. Their approach to the "other" is a more one-
way view of how GOs operate (2000:421). 
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inequality. In other words, not all high status persons possess "powerful virtual selves" as some are 
weak links and wastrels who try to manipulate their situations, and not all low status persons accept 
"oppressive others" as some are protesters who engage in resistance and "counter-othering" ( e.g., 
Malcolm X's revisioning of white behaviors). Thus, GOs have a combined and interactive process of 
"assertion and assignment" with externalization through framed, shaped and selected others, and 
internalization by imposed groups, behaviors and structures (Berbrier quoting S. Cornell (2008:479)). 
Positive and Negative GOs. GOs have a relationship between each other and often have 
positive and negative characteristics (Perinbanayagam 1975: 514-5; Lawler et al 2008: 523; Crouch 
1958). Some GOs are more intrinsic to the construction of the self and are highly internalized. Other 
GOs are disputed and resisted (see 16 ---> 17 ---> I 8 in table 1 ). For instance, African-Americans with a 
dual consciousness have one GO composed of fellow African-Americans and many of them in this 
GO have a favorable viewpoint of each other. They may also have a white oppositional GO that they 
negatively internalize and actively resist. Both have an effect, but it is clear that GOs are not always 
positive, and that the existence of negative GOs are the clear indicators of difference, whether it is 
based on race or gender, or any other aspect of life ( e.g., teams, in-crowds, gamblers, etc.). Thus, the 
actual assessments of a person do not lead deterministically to one or another GO (Yeung and Martin 
2003; Jchiyama 1993; Felson 1985, 1993). Shibutani's master processes of ethnic relations are at 
work in these positive and negative evaluations (1970). Differentiating processes occur with stable 
relations of inequality, but they are often brought about by more disjunctive processes coming out of 
protest and conflict. Sustaining processes involve mutual support in stable and homogenous social 
worlds, and they are brought about by integrative processes whereby groups become identified as 
similar (Shibutani 1970; Wacker 1995). 
Negative and positive appraisals imply a ranking, which Lewis refers to as "ordered into a 
hierarchy ofrelevancies" (I 979: 284). Burke goes further on the "self-verification" among identities 
and comes close to multiple GOs in his "general principles": (1) people seek out situations to verify 
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identities, (2) sitnations contain meanings that activate identities, (3) identities with common means 
are activated together and develop similar levels of salience, ( 4) identities adjust to pressures of 
situations, (5) multiple identities among people result in complex and sometimes contradictory 
reactions despite some similarities, (6) identities higher in the salience hierarchy are more likely to be 
verified, and (7) identities with more commitment take preference in verification processes 
(2003:203). Although Burke focuses more on identity and only implies a GO, his focus is analogous 
to ours, as we could nearly replace identity and "reflected appraisals" with a combination of selves 
and GOs.14 
In evaluating how much influence two GOs might have, a process similar to differential 
association theory operates whereby the "I" evaluates two different groups in terms of an 
accumulation of definitions, values, or positions that one has in common with one group or the other 
(Title, Burke and Jackson 1986; Akers and Jensen 2006). However, the exact mechanisms of 
ranking in terms of the GO's importance to the self may be conscious or unconscious and this is an 
important complexity in the process as indicated in the discussion about unconscious racism 
(Quillian 2008). Ranking is done partly on the basis of comfort level of emotions, but also on the 
basis of aspirations for social and cultural capital as in interaction ritual chains -- one may admire a 
group of people with whom they currently feel very uncomfortable (Collins 1988, 2004). In this 
sense, two networks and their values are weighed both rationally and emotionally in terms of positive 
and negative experiences. The relative weights of these experiences will shift one toward one or the 
14 Mead's theory is analogous to Burke's (2006) identity control theory: the 'self is "identity;" 
'presentations of self would be akin to "identity standards;" the 'generalized and significant others' 
would be approximated by "perceptions;" "reflected appraisals" or the "reflected self'; and the 'I' 
would operate like the "comparator" in evaluating feedback and making adjustments. But the group 
nature of"perceptions" and "reflected appraisals" seem to be downplayed in Burke's approach. 
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other GO, but third or fourth GOs may also exist. For instance, one may decide between the 
upwardly mobile GO does not accept you, and the poor neighborhood GO who does. But a kin 
group that is strongly in favor of upward mobility may turn the tide toward the upwardly mobile GO 
in forming the self. 
Changes or disturbances in the feedback coming from a GO can lead to changes in self 
identity. Laub finds that "turning points were critical to understanding processes of change" for 
criminals, and that these turning points away from crime tended to come from "job stability and 
marital attachment in adulthood" (2006:243). More generally, Burke (2006: 85, 94) finds three 
reasons for identity changes which we can mold toward SI: (a) persistent discrepancies in feedback 
from a GO leading to slow change, (b) "multiple identities activated together, whose verifications 
require opposing meanings, and ( c) catastrophic events that impose new GOs and identities 
(sometimes destroying some old ones). We can add another change when a neophyte enters an 
entirely new situation and encounters many new groups when old statuses are canceled out ( e.g., do 
not wear your high school varsity jacket in college). 
Further, a coalition theory of GOs would supplement the balance of positive and negative 
experiences ( e.g., differential association theory). Thus, primary group GOs based on family, school 
and peer groups might combine with work, religious, political, friendship, recreational, voluntary and 
other GOs. In some ways, a cross-pressure theory of social constructed GOs could be developed. 
But GOs need not be ranked when people see themselves in equally valued groups. For instance, one 
might equally value GOs based on church members, golf buddies, and neighbors. Thus, GOs may 
simply exist in their own co-equal and valued spheres. However, it is when some of them are 
negative and ranked that GOs assume importance for constructing difference. 
We use two studies - black Americans pursuing upward mobility, and teamwork and gender 
among autoworkers -to illustrate this ranking process. For the racial example, Author B (2008) 
interviewed Burton, a black male professional from an English-speaking Caribbean country. His first 
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GO is based on family. His mother was a significant other for pursuing academic goals, and his 
extended family also reinforced his mother's views toward schooling. His education in this 
Caribbean country was quite good and took place after his country gained independence from the 
British. Consequently, he went to school under a proud and dominant black majority school system 
and did not have a dual consciousness with a negative white GO. This changed when Burton came to 
the US. He said "I didn't know I was black" until he came here, which indicates a strong "white 
generalized other" that has a number of negative messages about performance. Although he 
overcame these "reflected appraisals," they strongly affected him. Partially as a result, he saw 
religion as a significant source of positive motivation in his life and fellowship with his church was 
very important. Thus, his second GO is formed on what he has framed as the white society, 
especially at work, and in response to this he selected and shaped a third GO based on his 
relationship with white and black church members. A specific GO that focused on African-
Americans was somewhat absent (see Figure I for these GOs). 
**********Figure 1 ********** 
Second, Dorothy is an African-American woman who serves as provost at a university and 
has four different GOs. The first GO involves her family, especially her mother, who was very 
central to the construction of her own self. Although she grew up in "pretty much a ghetto," her 
mother was the key person in getting her to pursue higher education. Dorothy's mother provided 
encouragement as well as a source of confidence-building when GOs collided. She encountered 
positive and negative generalized others from both white and blacks. One negative example comes 
from a moment where she was confronted by a white professor who said "You will never make it 
here because you're from" ... the ghetto and you "students don't have the intellect to get through." 
This negative, white generalized other was second in importance to the construction of her self in 
challenging her to not only finish her education at a top university but eventually to pursue and 
receive a Ph.D. as well. Later Dorothy ran into the same professor who said: "Oh my goodness! ... 
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you're about as rare as this Susan B. Anthony dollar." She took this in a negative way, but her 
familial GO helped her interpret the comments in a uniquely positive way and boosted her self 
confidence. Dorothy's negative and white GO was also important when she entered and eventually 
succeeded in academia. "But you have a large number of people who also don't believe that."' A 
third GO that was central to the creation and maintenance of Dorothy's self was a black, sub-cultural 
GO. This GO was largely negative and this affected her more deeply than the racism of the first 
white GO. "I was living in" a black community who said "'Oh, you're not dark enough."' She was 
constantly being accused of not being in touch with black issues and felt that she did not fit 
anywhere. Again, her familial GO continued to serve as a constant source of support and helped her 
to get through this issue. A fourth GO was more positive and came later from white staff members 
who did not buy into the racial ideology that blacks were in top positions just because of the color of 
their skin. These whites were important to her because they prevented her from becoming bitter and 
from lumping whites into one category. They worked together well with her and respected her 
expertise and judgment. See figure 1, part I to compare these persons' GOs. 
In a gender study, Author C looked at a Japanese transplant, and an automotive parts supplier. 
In the main auto transplant, team leaders preferred gender-mixed teams because the blend of 
feminine and masculine gives teams a family atmosphere. Janice found that in the initial phases, 
teams in the main transplant were structured around "the guys versus the girls" dichotomy. GOs 
were then refashioned from gender or racial binaries to "my work team." She found that some male 
team members even felt more comfortable when more women were around. The presence of women 
on the line brings not only a new level of calmness, but also a feeling of security. One male team 
member said he does not want to ever have to work in a male-dominated group because it resembles 
working in a prison. For Janice, the supportive team GO assumes more importance than either male 
or female GOs (part 2 in figure I). One man said: "I am looking at you like a person, not at your 
sex, race .... I don't really care if somebody is a minority or not." Thus, for Janice the team GO was 
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a stronger influence on her than a gendered which have not disappeared but are ranked lower (part 2, 
figure 1). 
In the supplier plant, GOs were ranked differently because gender had more prominence as a 
GO. First, there seemed to be a difference concerning injuries. Cynthia thought that the men's 
higher injury rate was due to their "macho attitude" that they cannot get hurt. She said: "Guys feel 
they are tough ... they are risk-takers and their egos get them in trouble." Some men agree that some 
of them want to get the work done without taking care of safety, and are more reckless with their 
bodies than women. A few team members said that women have safer behavior because of their 
experience with raising children and being a caretaker at home. Gendered others were also strong 
because relationships between female team members are sometimes described as catty or nitpicky. 
Jealousy was apparent between women who worked in predominantly female teams. Cynthia said: 
"When I started seeing this guy, I don't know if it was jealousy, but the other girls stopped talking to 
me .... " She also said: When an attractive girl ... would come to the group, they did not want 
anything to do with her ... Nobody will talk to her." Male teams have more competition and trash 
talking, and they have macho attitude of picking on the weaker guys. One man said: "Guys are 
harder on one another ... Look at that sissy, he can't keep up.'" Gendered GOs ranked higher with 
people in the supplier plant. Thus, when the ranking of GOs are compared in figure I, the team GO 
ranked higher than the gendered others for the transplant workers, and just the opposite in the 
supplier plant. 
Thus, both studies illustrate the different ways that GOs are shaped, framed, ranked and 
utilized by four different groups of people. 
A Model of Selves and GOs 
The processes outlined by Mead and Blumer need to be brought up to date concerning multiple 
selves and GOs. Stets and Burke (2000:230) have done work in specifying the selection of identities 
through their concept of salience based on accessibility and fit. We follow their example about the 
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self and then specify the processes involved concerning the GO. This approach shows multiple 
forms of "selves," "me's" and "GOs" in Figure 2. 
**********Figure 2********** 
The basic model shows how a self monitors situations (1 and 2) and the "!" (3), and then it presents 
various selves or "me's" (5) through staging (4) and framing (6) in social interaction situations (8). 
The self collects the reactions of the others in social interaction by constructing GOs (7), which are 
then fed back into the self and the "I." Through socialization, individuals may have a number of 
GOs ( e.g., my family, people at work, whites and blacks, etc.).15 While framing may be used in 
staging and the presentation of self, this paper stresses the framing that goes on concerning the GO in 
item 6 of figure 2. "Selecting" places the people who fit into one's various GOs and it also involves 
a sense that one knows how others think about these groupings. More internalized "framing" 
involves the social organization of those people concerning situations, emotions, values, and norms 
that make this GO somewhat coherent and worthy of being recognized. "Ranking" involves seeing 
each GO as positive, negative, or neutral, and assessing this GO's importance to the individual's self. 
While ranking may be intense due to positive and negative aspects of difference, ranking may also be 
oflesser importance for people whose lives are less contested. The different GOs are the sum of(a) 
one's impression of their own staged and framed performances before others (3-->4-->5-->8 and 
3-->6-->5-->8 in figure 2), (b) one's estimate of the others' judgments or reactions (8-->7), and (c) 
one's selecting, shaping and ranking of the judgments and emotional reactions involving these GOs 
(7->6).16 
15 This model is based partly on Turner and Collins (1989) and Turner (1988). 
16 Each presentation of a "me" does not create a separate "GO" because this would then overly 
saturate the self formation model with GOs. But each GO is constructed from different groupings of 
various presentations of self. 
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Regarding difference, an individual may feel either high or low rank (to make it simple), and 
those status rankings are associated with various positive or negative emotions resulting in GOs 
being validated, questioned or rejected. But an individual may have a number of GOs that are 
relatively co-equal without any particular rank. Various selves are then constructed or reconstructed 
based on the feedback generated by a number of GOs. It is important to note that these GOs are 
framed or constructed themselves. Individuals can choose to ignore people as inconsequential, 
biased, or programmed; however, some people in coercive situations cannot be overlooked ( e.g., 
prisoners cannot ignore gnards). This is how the GO differs from roles. Organizations and social 
interaction of others create roles, but the GO is based on those persons whom the individual 
recognizes as being important enough to monitor, select, and shape. One can even operate in the 
interstices of roles. The components of the GO need not always be direct contacts. They can also 
consist of indirect contacts who may comment on their presentations of self made to others ( e.g., 
Iago's invidious comments about Desdemona to Othello). Thus, GOs have a connection with direct 
interaction through the looking glass self, and also an indirect connection without interaction with the 
generalized group. But they do not include everyone in the community, as is sometimes implied by 
Mead. 
The importance of multiple and somewhat specific GOs is that researchers should pay much 
more attention to how people frame the others whom they attend to, and also pay attention to those 
whom they might ignore. This would also involve the differences between "perceived GOs" (what 
you think the GO sees) and "actual GOs" (what the others actually see) (Quarantelli and Cooper 
1967:296). The easiest way to identify a GO is when a person refers to "we," "us", "them," or 
"they," and the singular and plural "you" (Wiley 1994; Dunn 1998). One most often constructs a 
"we's" or "they's" at work, in one's social life, and in one's family and neighborhood. The key to 
finding "multiple GOs" and in the process finding "multiple selves" is to locate who might be in the 
GO being discussed. This is real social construction, not imposing role-taking or a group (Turner 
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1956; Turner 1988; Stryker and Burke 2000; Stryker 2002). This would benefit by more attention to 
social network data for each GO and attention to who knows whom in these networks since the 
transmissibility of norms and behaviors may be dependent on the density of these networks. 
Difference emerges from this model from two directions: (1) it is socially constructed by the 
GO in many different encounters (internalization), and (2) it is socially imposed from the group level 
often in a historical context ( externalization). The first approach fuses the processes of multiple GOs 
with expectations states theory. It looks at the encounters, interactions, and exchanges of people in 
groups to create a sense of difference. The difference then follows the tenets of "a sense of group 
position" especially with groups developing and promoting their interests based on this difference. 
The second approach takes a "larger sense of group position" as already established with individuals 
and smaller groups contextualized in these situations. However, it must be recognized that this 
"sense of group position" must be accepted by individuals and they often do not automatically accept 
it. People either are not aware of other's warnings of"group position" or don't believe it. Social 
construction emerges again as each person tests their apparent 'group position,' and ifrebuffed by 
the other group, are more inclined to recognize it. However, this testing does not occur continuously 
and some people simply accept their "sense of group position," sometimes when contrary 
interactions are present. 
Using "individual" and "overall" GOs (Dodds et al. 1997), the creation of a larger "sense of 
group position" or difference would be the movement from a number of specific GOs at work, at 
school, in the neighborhood, and on the street to a more abstract GO that focuses on strangers 
categorized into large categories. This "meta-GO" then becomes an overarching marker of 
difference in social interaction, and it then gets built up into a structural feature of society. With 
evidence from specific interactions gathered into GOs, the "meta-GO" as "a sense of group position" 
becomes a guide to behavior where individual interactions are no longer relevant. 
Conclusion 
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There is a rich body of literature on difference in SI; however, there are oversights with respect 
to systematically applying the basic concepts of the theory, especially in not using the GO. While 
some theorists mention difference in general, difference is conceptualized too broadly, when it 
actually needs more specificity. A key to solving this problem is to develop the original SI concept 
of the GO into multiple GOs, which match multiple selves, and show how they develop together. 
From there, the selfs conceptions of difference can be constructed from multiple GOs. 
Two points about the GO are especially important. First, the GO should be re-conceptualized 
and made multiple, and then GOs will provide the basis for socially constructing difference through 
Blumer's sense of group position. This involves recognizing that multiple selves routinely exist and 
they come from multiple GOs. They are socially constructed through framing, not always the result 
of roles, and this process of social construction may involve internalization and externalization. 
Further, each GO can be conceptualized as a social network which may or may not be a group. And 
finally, GOs most often are ranked in terms of importance to the self, or they maybe co-equal and 
simply different parts of life. But when they are ranked, difference typically occurs. 
Second, difference emerges from these ranked GOs. When many people realize that they have 
constructed a racial or gendered GO that is similar to other peoples' GO, they form a sense of group 
position. Thus, when intersubjective GOs overlap a great deal between people through the 
intersections of their social constructions, a sense of group position develops, but when GOs have 
only minimal overlap with group members, then a sense of group position will not form even though 
people are still connected. "Identification" GOs are likely to overlap, and "valuation" GOs are less 
likely to connect (Turner and Stets 2004). Thus, by mapping out multiple GOs and ranking them, the 
commonality of particular GOs that people have with many others demonstrates the social 
construction of a sense of group position, which seems to be missing in traditional SI accounts. 
Thus, the self monitors situations and the"!" presents various selves or "me's" through staging and 
framing in social interaction situations. The self collects the reactions of the others in social 
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interaction by constructing GOs, which are then fed back into the self and the I. These different GOs 
are the sum of one's impression of their own staged and framed performances, one's estimate of the 
others' reactions, and one's selecting, framing and ranking of the judgments and emotional reactions 
ofGOs. 
Schwalbe and colleagues (2000) consist of the strongest attempt to focus on "othering," but an 
entire issue of Symbolic Interaction (Anderson and Snow, 2001) that was devoted to inequality only 
mentions the "GO" once. And while "others evaluations," "othering" and "reflected appraisals" 
briefly appear, the emphasis is on singular rather than multiple processes, and on what we refer to as 
externalization rather than internalization. The contribution of this paper is to add a more theoretical 
dimension to Schwalbe et al. in order to specify the mechanisms of the GO to make "othering" a 
deeper and more complex process that is both external and internal, active and re-active, and 
preceding the re-creation of the self. Some interactionists hint at this when referring to a need to deal 
with the intersections of multiple forms of inequality in gender, race and class (Hall 2003: 40-2), and 
the active nature ofreflective appraisal processes (Anderson and Snow 2001: 400). 
There are two further developments that need to be made in research concerning the GO. 
First, framing needs to be more consistently developed to go beyond Goffman's notion of situational 
framing, and the social movement use of ideological framing appears to be helpful. In the three part 
theory of framing the GO presented here, "selecting" concerns the choice of persons to be in ones 
various GOs, "framing" is the ideational content that puts these people together through situations or 
ideas, and "ranking" looks at how they see some GOs being more important than others. Further 
research in this area would bring out all three of these processes. Second, the formation ofGOs lays 
the basis for extending SI further in the direction of social structure. This would lead first to a "sense 
of group position" and then to "public opinion" and a link could be made to Stryker's structural SI. 
It is often said that SI is a paradigm or framework instead of a theory, while identity theory 
and affect theories in social exchange are increasing their specification of processes and contexts. 
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And in some ways but not all, they are coming closer to SI. SI needs to extend itself in similar ways 
and this will lead to major theoretical developments. This paper has argued that this can occur by 
balancing its concepts of the self and GO, and in bridging to other identity and exchange theories by 
specifying its processes in useful and sometimes analogous ways. 
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Figure 1: Comparisons aud Transformations of Multiple Generalized Others 
1. African-American and Afro-Caribbean Mobility: 
Burton: an Afro-Caribbean Ph.D. 
and College Professor 
GO,~ Afro-Caribbean friends & family 
GO2 ~A multi-racial American church 
GO3 ~ White and Afro-American 
acquaintances in favor of mobility 
GO4 ~ White discrimination and 




Dorothy: an African-American 
Ph.D. professor and Provost 
GO 1 ~Afro-American friends & 
family 
G02 ~ White staff and friends in 
favor of black upward mobility 
GO3 ~ African-Americans who feel 
that she is not black enough. 
G04 ~ White discrimination & 
prejudice at work 
2. Japanese Transplant Automotive Assembly Plaut aud Supplier: 
Janice: White woman on the line 
at a Japanese transplant 
GO,~ Supportive team members 
GO2 ~ Supportive group members 
GO3 ~ Other women at work 
rriembers 





Cynthia: White woman on the 
line at an automotive suppliE:r 
GO,~ Men at work 
GO2 ~ Women at work 
GO3 = Inconsequential team 
GO4 ~ Inconsequential group 
members 





ritual ( cultural 
Ir-
scripts) 
\ Objectifying different 'me' paths 
~ I 
(1) Multiple (2) Monitoring: (3) The I: (5) The Me's (8) Social action: 
selves: Selfs - Monitoring and - Strategically ____. or presentation " Social interaction with perception of interpreting of selecting a of selves: others: 
material, survival, situations and salient self -Me h,b,c - habit, tradition 
& social identities: events at work, or selves in -Me2a,b,c - emotion 
- Self 1 home, and choosing to -Me3a,b,c - reason (practical, 
- Self 2 elsewhere act. Using various procedural, value, or 
- Self 3 \\l resources theoretical) I ! I 
(6) Social construction (7) Framing: 
of generalized others: - Selecting the people 
Creating GOs based on in the GO other 
the performances of - Shaping the 
various Me's: ideas & behavior 
- GO I based on Mel a,b,c that bring them 
- GO 2 based on Me 2 a,b,c together, 
- GO 3 based on Me 3 a,b,c - Ranking GOs 
' 
Multiple 'me 's contributing to 'generalized other' paths 
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Table 1: Constructions of Generalized Others (GO) based on Self-Perceptions' 
Attributions of Inequality External or Valuation l11ternal or lde11tification 
Ge11eralized Others Ge11era/ized Others 
]-Merit-based status: 2-Self-justified othering: 3- "Powe1ful virtual selves": b 
High rank due to Validated rank of GO Positive GO based on confidence 
ability or entitlement. compared to others with and positive emotions (with 
pride, satisfaction, or arrogance. infrequent conversions to the 
other side with an alternate GO). 
High 4-Ascription: 5- "Defensive othering": b 6-Defensive internalization: 
Status High rank due to Ambivalence and uneasiness Positive GO and self based on 
ascription, family or luck. about won rank compared ambivalent status with some 
to lower GO. defensive emotions. 
7-Being protected: 8-Oppressive othering: 9-Manipulative internalization: 
High rank due to bias and Fear oflosing high rank with GO based on active repression 
discrimination against others. guilt, anger and rectitude of others. 
about own and lower GO. 
JO-Degraded status: 11-Accepted othering: 12-Creating negative sub-cultures: 
Low rank due to the Acceptance of imposed Negative GO based on deference 
lack of personal or group and superior GO based on and respect for authority, and 
ability or talent. deference & shame. low self esteem often involving 
deviance and dropping out. 
Low 13-Group Subordination: 14- "Defensive othering": b 15-Adaptational othering: 
Status Low rank due to luck, Acceptance of superior GO GO and self based on "trading 
ascription, or chance but ambivalence and anxiety power for patronage" or "forming 
about imposed GO. sub-cultures" with opportunism. b 
16-Discr;,,dnation: 17-Counter-othering: 18-Creating positive sub-cultures: 
Low rank due to Angry rejection of imposed GO based on active resistance 
discrimination and bias GO and construction of and re-interpretation of ones 
positive alternative GO. own group. 
Notes: 
"Draws upon Turner and Stets (2004 ). 
b Headings in quotation marks come from Schwalbe et al. (2000). 
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